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1.	 Introduction
　Japanʼs policies toward the Democratic Peopleʼs Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
are not only issues concerning bilateral relations, but also complex international 
political issues which are determined by the complex political situations in 
Northeast Asia, including division of the Korean Peninsula, the confrontations 
between the two camps during the Cold War, and the extension of the United 
States of America (US)-South Korea alliance as well as the US-Japan alliance 
after the Cold War. It can be seen that all of the above affect the geopolitical 
developments in Northeast Asia as well as the foreign strategy of every country 
in the region.1 Moreover, Japanʼs policy toward North Korea has a direct impact 
on the changes in Japanʼs domestic political situation. Thus, it can be seen 
that only when putting Japan-DPRK relations in the political framework of 
Northeast Asia and analyzing through multilateral perspectives, can we grasp 
the essence of Japan-DPRK relations and predict the future trend.2
　North Korea is the only country among those which were invaded by Japan 
that has yet to realize a normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. The 
References
1 Liu Xingnan, Evolution and future prospects of postwar Japan-DPRK relations, 
Dissertations of the East Asian Forum, July 21, 2018.
2 Zhang Jingquan，Paradox of Regionalization and Securitization: The Role of State 
and Alliance in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asia Forum,No.1, 2017, pp.107-108.
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succession in North Korean supreme power has brought new opportunities 
to improve relations between Japan and North Korea. On December 17, 2011, 
Kim Jong Il, the DPRK National Defense Commission Chairman, passed away. 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Ilʼs death meant that some changes would occur 
regarding the regional security environment on the Korean Peninsula; that is, it 
marked the end of an era in North Korea and other neighboring countries. The 
six-party countries, including Japan, were not willing to see the situation on 
the Korean Peninsula result in upheavals. Faced with this situation, the Noda 
cabinet cooperated with the international community in promoting stability 
on the Korean Peninsula while seeking to establish a dialogue channel with 
the DPRKʼs new regime by implementing a policy easing its heretofore stance 
on the DPRK. After Kim Jong Ilʼs death, his son Kim Jong Un was named his 
successor.3 The Noda cabinet and the Kim Jong Un government both expressed 
willingness to improve relations between the two countries, which created 
favorable conditions for the development of Japan-DPRK relations.
　Within the Noda cabinetʼs nearly 16 months in power, however, there was no 
substantive progress in Japan-DPRK relations. Objectively speaking, the Noda 
cabinet failed to put forward good solutions on North Koreaʼs nuclear and 
missile issues as well as the abduction issue. Furthermore, the Noda cabinetʼs 
diplomacy toward North Korea focused solely on the level of “talk or not talk” 
and “how to create or keep the conversation window,” and its negotiations with 
North Korea also remained in the diagnostic phase.4
　However, the Cabinet laid a foundation for Japanʼs policies toward the 
DPRK in the “post-Kim Jong Il era” solving uncertainties about Kim Jong Unʼs 
government guidelines and attitudes toward Japan to some extent. In this 
sense, the Noda cabinetʼs policy of easing restrictions toward North Korea had 
its merits and achievements which cannot be ignored. If the Cabinet did not 
3 Powel Bill, The sun also rises, Time 179(1), January 9, 2012.
4 Yin Hu, A research on DPJ's North Korea policy, Journal of Dalian University, No.4, 
2017, pp.31.
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pave the way for a policy toward North Korea, it would be extremely difficult 
for the two countries to reach an agreement on the re-investigation of the 
“abduction issue” on May 29, 2014.5 That is, it opened the channels of dialogue, 
which provided a policy basis for the next Prime Minister Shinzo Abeʼs rapid 
negotiations with North Korea. Therefore, rational analysis of the Noda cabinetʼ
s foreign policy is helpful in grasping the entire picture of the interactions 
between Northeast Asian countries concerning the Korean issues from August 
2011 to December 2012.6 Nevertheless, there is not a lot of research on the Noda 
cabinetʼs policy toward North Korea among Northeast Asian scholars, and it 
is also rare to see the research achievements of studying the Cabinetʼs policy 
toward North Korea in the framework of Northeast Asia. Therefore, this study 
will attempt to sort out and analyze the Cabinetʼs policy toward the DPRK, and 
will discuss the style and features of its policy toward the DPRK.
2.	 Establishment	 of	 Noda	 Cabinet’s	 Easing	 Policy	 toward	 DPRK	
(August	2011	-	December	2011)
　On August 30, 2011, Yoshihiko Noda, the representative of the Democratic 
Party of Japan, was elected as the 95th Prime Minister in the named election 
during the plenary session of the House of Representatives. After he took office, 
his cabinet had to face one thorny problem to wit the tensions and chaos on the 
Korean Peninsula. Facing all these challenges, the Noda cabinet implemented 
a series of foreign policies which played a vital role in the trend in matters 
concerning Northeast Asia.
　After Noda took office, he inherited and continued the easing policy toward 
the DPRK which had been implemented by the previous cabinet led by Naoto 
Kan. At the beginning of its governance, the Noda cabinet established the easing 
5 Japan, North Korea both serve own ends with deal, The Japan News, May 31, 2014, 
Retrieved from Yomidasu Rekishikan database.
6 Yoshihiko Noda became prime minister on August 30, 2011 and resigned on 
December 26, 2012.
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policy toward the DPRK, which was neither expedient nor was it isolated; 
rather, it was closely related to the overall strategic considerations of its internal 
and external policies. The main purposes and background of the establishment 
of the easing policy by the Noda cabinet can be summarized into the following 
four points.
　The first point was to win domestic support. For Japan, the “abduction issue” 
has always been the one which heightens Japanese nerves and always affects 
the political situation in Japan. Moreover, Japan also faces a direct threat from 
North Koreaʼs nuclear propulsion program. Therefore, a dialogue with North 
Korea and diplomatic achievements were probably a key to bringing support 
by the Japanese people to the Noda abinet. After the Democratic Party took 
office, its support rate remained in the doldrums. As a result, the Noda cabinet 
demonstrated greater concern to the DPRK issue in order to win national 
support through diplomacy with North Korea.
　The next point was to maintain policy coordination between the Allies. On 
December 6, 2010, the foreign ministers from the U.S., Japan and South Korea 
held a meeting in Washington and decided to resolve tensions in Northeast 
Asia caused by North Koreaʼs shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea the 
previous month.7 Through dialogue, after the meeting, the US and South Korean 
policy toward North Korea generally turned from “pressure” to “dialogue.”8 The 
Noda cabinet henceforth recognized that the relationship between North Korea 
and its neighboring countries gradually eased up, and Japanʼs tough measures 
against North Korea would make the international community have a negative 
impression on Japan. Moreover, the US established a smooth mechanism for 
dialogue with North Korea. To this extent, Prime Minister Noda worried that 
the US would engage in more overtopped diplomacy. He therefore sought to 
establish his own mechanisms for dialogue with the DPRK.
7 Triple team condemns Pyongyan, Japan, U.S., ROK urge China action, The Japan 
News, December 8, 2010, Retrieved from Yomidasu Rekishikan database.
8 Jin Xianghai, The new trends of South Korea-Japan relations, South Korea 
Observation, Press of Yan Bian University, 2013, p. 84.
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　The third point was to guarantee the achievements of Naoto Kanʼs cabinet 
policy toward North Korea. On January 11, 2011, Seiji Maehara, the Foreign 
Minister from the Kan cabinet said at a press conference that Japan was willing 
to restart the dialogue between Japan and the DPRK unconditionally, from 
which the easing policy toward the DPRK was started.9 Noda attached great 
importance to the channels of dialogue and negotiation achievements during 
the Kan cabinet governing period and strived to inherit its achievements.
　The final point was to change the unfavorable situation with neighboring 
countries through diplomacy. During the Kan Cabinet period of governance, 
territorial disputes led to a sharp deterioration in relations between Japan and 
China, South Korea and Russia. On the other hand, North Korea is in a unique 
political position in Northeast Asia, and has close political relations with China, 
South Korea and Russia. On the basis of this, the Noda cabinet tried to improve 
Japan-DPRK relations, and attempted to mitigate the difficult situations of 
diplomacy with neighboring countries.10
　In consideration of the above domestic and international political situation, 
on September 17, 2011, the Noda cabinet made a decision to stop adopting 
new sanctions against North Korea in order to improve bilateral relations. On 
October 11, 2011, the Noda cabinet also approved a four-day visit to North 
Korea by eight doctors from the Hiroshima Medical Association.11 This visit was 
the second visit to the DPRK by the association since September 2008. In the 
past three years, although the association repeatedly applied to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to carry out investigations on the atomic bomb victims, it had 
not been approved until Noda became prime minister.12
9 Whether Foreign Minister Maeharaʼs statement can bring changes in the Far Eastern 
government, Administrative Investigation News, January 26, 2011.
10 Zhang Liangui, DPRK-Japan relations warm up, DPRK take the initiative in showing 
good will, Japan will use this to fight against China. Global Times, January 18, 2013.
11 Kitachosen no hibakusha, hatsu no shinsatsu zitsugen e tokyoku, taido nanka 
kenʼishikai toko, The Asahi Shimbun, October 12, 2011, Retrieved from Kikuzo II 
Visualdatabase.
12 Zhang Liangui, DPRK-Japan relations warm up, DPRK take the initiative in showing 
good will, Japan will use this to fight against China. Global Times, January 18, 2013.
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　On November 15, 2011, the Noda cabinet made an exception to allow 
Japanese football fans to go to North Korea to cheer for Japanʼs national soccer 
team who were taking partin theWorld Cup third-round qualifying match in 
Pyongyan.13 During the 2010 Womenʼs Asian Cup, many Japanese Democrats, 
including several cabinet members, expressed their opposition to the DPRK 
women soccer teamʼs visit to Japan to participate in the tournament. By contrast, 
for that special approval of the fansʼ visit to the DPRK, none of the Cabinet 
members objected. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Democrats also remained 
silent, which indicated that Nodaʼs easing policy toward the DPRK was widely 
supported by the Cabinet members.14
　However, soon after the Cabinet implemented “flirting” measures with the 
DPRK, Kim Jong Il suddenly died, so the Cabinet was forced to experience 
unexpected situations which were special and rare, as seen in several ups and 
downs in the following chapters.
3.	 Correspondence	 to	 Situation	 after	 Kim	 Jong	 Il’s	 Death	 and	
Extension	of	Easing	Policy	(December	2011	-	January	2012)
　On December 19, the North Korean media announced the news of the North 
Korean leader Kim Jong Ilʼs death. Immediately after that, the Noda cabinet 
held a press conference, at which Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura 
said the Japanese government expressed condolences after hearing of the 
sudden death of Kim Jong Il. This statement was immediately met with critical 
condemnation from the families of the kidnapped people and public opinion. 
Shortly thereafter, Fujimura changed his words to “The Japanese government 
has no intention of mourning.”15 It can be seen that the Noda cabinet had made 
13 Soccer: North Korea may accept 150 fans from Japan, Asia & Japan Watch, November 2, 
2011, Retrieved from Kikuzo II Visualdatabase.
14 Icy relationship between Japan and DPRK shows signs of improvement, JP 
News Network, November 2, 2011, Retrieved from http://jpnews.kr/sub_read.
html?uid=11877&section=sc2& section2=변진일
15 Japan didnʼt show condolence to North Korea, Guang Zhou Daily, December 23, 2011.
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insufficient preparations for the unexpected event of Kim Jong Ilʼs death.
　In order to deal with the sudden death of Kim Jong Il effectively, the Cabinet 
set up a crisis management center and held a security meeting.16 The Noda 
cabinet also demanded that the Japanese security forces and coast guard 
strengthen the garrison along coastal areas to make proper preparations for the 
possible wave of refugees brought on by sudden changes in North Korea.17 In 
addition, the Cabinet adopted a foreign policy to “share information with the 
international community, pursue common interests and maintain stability on 
the Korean Peninsula.”
　After the death of Kim Jong Il, there also appeared some new trends to 
re-evaluate Japan-DPRK relations in Japan, which laid foundation for the 
implementation of the Noda cabinetʼs easing policy toward the DPRK. Haruki 
Wada, Professor Emeritus of Tokyo University, published an article in World, 
in which he emphasized the importance of the normalization of diplomatic 
relations between Japan and the DPRK.18 Japan Monthly also published a special 
issue, “Now is the best time to promote Japan-DPRK diplomatic relations,” 
proposing the necessity of the negotiations to normalize diplomatic ties between 
the two countries.
　At this time, Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also expressed his 
condolences on the death of Kim Jong Il, and called on the Democratic Party 
government not to solve the problem only through confrontations.19 In addition, 
some social elites such as Koichi Ishizaka and Sumiko Shimizu exerted a 
positive influence on the Japanese government and public opinion through the 
channel of the liaison meeting for normalization of Japan-DPRK diplomatic 
16 After the death of General Secretary Kim Jong Il, the government opened security 
meeting, Asahi News, December 19, 2011.
17 Defense Minister: North Korea military has no movement, and maritime security 
team should strengthen vigilance, Yomiuri News, December 19, 2011.
18 Wada Haruki, Kim Jong Il and Japan-DPRK diplomatic normalization, World, March, 
2012.
19 Solve the abduction issue and return to the international community, Asahi News, 
December 20, 2011.
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relations.20
　With domestic emergent response and international cooperation to seek 
security, the Noda cabinet also strengthened contacts with North Korea. 
Although the political situation in North Korea was still uncertain and Kim 
Jong Unʼs regime was not yet consolidated, the Noda cabinet did not want to 
see its easing policy toward the DPRK disappear in its nascent stages. On the 
other hand, signs of warming US-DPRK relations after Kim Jong Ilʼs death also 
created a favorable atmosphere for the Noda cabinetʼs implementation of the 
policy toward the DPRK.
　On December 25, 2011, Prime Minister Noda paid a visit to China and 
expressed to the Chinese government the will that the two governments 
should jointly keep peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and required 
information to share with the Chinese government.21
　On January 17, 2012, the Noda cabinet held a high-level officialsʼ meeting with 
the US and South Korean governments in Washington concerning the situation 
in the DPRK, reaching a consensus for further strengthening cooperation.22
　The first day after the death of Kim Jong Il, the US contacted North Korea 
through the New York channel, which is a diplomatic channel for the unofficial 
talks between the US and the North Korean authorities. On January 16, 2012, 
by active promoting from the US government, the Associated Press (AP) was 
allowed to open a branch bureau in Pyongyang.23 On February 14, 2012, the 
DPRK and the US held an official meeting in Beijing which was the first time 
in the “Kim Jong Un era.” In this dialogue, the US reiterated that it would no 
20 Association of Promoting Japan-DPRK Diplomatic Normalization: The urgent plea 
to the Japanese government, Forum for Peace, Human Rights and Environment, 
December 26, 2011, Retrieved fromhttp://www.peace-forum.com/seimei/20111226.
html
21 Nic-chu shuno tai kitachosen renkei o kakunin kaiyo mondai kyogi wakugumi 
sosetsu, December 26, 2011, Mainichi ShimbunShukusatsu-ban 62(12), Kondo Hiroyuki, 
ed., Mainichi Shimbunsha, 2012,p.959.
22 Nichi-bei-kan kita hikak-ka e kyocho soshoki shigo hatsuno kokankyu kyogi, The 
Yomiuri Shimbun, January 18, 2012, Retrieved from Yomidasu Rekishikandatabase.
23 Kim Jong Unʼs assistants, Yangtze Business, February 26, 2012.
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longer be hostile to the DPRK and was willing to take measures to expand 
bilateral exchanges in culture, education, sports and other fields, and also 
agreed to provide North Korea with 240,000 tons of nutritious food.24
　Motivated by many factors at home and abroad, the Noda cabinet actively 
communicated with North Korea. On January 9, 2012, the Cabinet sent back 
three North Koreans to North Korea via China who had drifted into Japanese 
waters near Shimane County due to vessel malfunction.25 On the same day, 
under the background of the smooth implementation of this “send back” 
program, Hiroshi Nakai, Japanʼs Minister of Abduction Issue (September 16, 
2009–September 17, 2010), and Song Il Ho, the North Korean ambassador in 
charge of normalizing relations with Japan, held a secret meeting in northeast 
China, thus achieving the goal of contact with Kim Jong Unʼs new government. 
Regarding this, Jin Matsubara, Japanʼs Minister of Abduction Issue (January 13, 
2012–October 1, 2012), commented, “Resolving the abduction issue ultimately 
has to rely on negotiations, otherwise there will be no progress,” which showed 
the Japanese government had a positive attitude to continue dialogues with 
North Korea.26
　On January 24, 2012, Prime Minister Noda pointed out in his Congress speech 
that Japan would be calmly concerned about changes in the regional situation 
brought on by the death of Kim Jong Il, cooperate closely with the relevant 
countries, strengthen the capacity of intelligence gathering, and spare no effort 
in dealing with possible unexpected events. Meanwhile, Japan took the “Japan-
24 Why can DPRK and the US reach consensus?, Tai Zhou News, March 2, 2012.
25 [Shucho] Kitachosen no hyoryusen zyomuin iso wa sokei ni sugiru, The Sankei 
Shimbun, January 10, 2012, Retrieved from Sankei Shimbun database.
26 Japan claimed that DPRK sent a positive signal to Japan, Morning News, January 20, 
2012.
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DPRK Pyongyang Declaration”27 28 as the basis for trying to solve various 
pending issues between the two countries and also made efforts to achieve the 
normalization of diplomatic relations.29
　As described above, the Noda cabinet had certain expectations on North 
Koreaʼs new leader Kim Jong Un. Even after the death of Kim Jong Il, the 
Cabinet still insisted on the implementation of the easing policy toward North 
Korea which was adopted at the beginning of its office and created favorable 
conditions for the improvement of relations between Japan and North Korea.
4.	 First	 Ups	 and	 Downs	 of	 Japan-DPRK	 Relations	 during	 Noda	
Cabinet	Office	(First	half	of	2012)
　The Noda cabinet policy which aimed at promoting relations between Japan 
and North Korea also gained a positive response from the government of Kim 
Jong Un. For example, on January 22, 2012, the DPRK released two Japanese 
suspects who were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking,30 indicating that 
the Kim Jong Un government wanted to improve Japan-DPRK relations. After 
the death of Kim Jong Il, the main reasons for the Kim Jong Un government 
promoting relations between Japan and North Korea in the short term can be 
divided into the two points below.
　One of the reasons is economic. North Koreaʼs economic development 
27 According to Blomquist & Wertz (2015: 4), it was produced in September 2002 
when “Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang … in the 
first meeting of the two countriesʼ heads of state.” Under the Declaration, “North 
Korea agreed to extend the missile test moratorium that began in 1999, fulfill its 
commitments regarding its nuclear program, and continue to pursue bilateral 
negotiations toward normalization.”
28 Rachel Blomquist and Daniel Wertz, An overview of North Korea-Japan relations, 
NCNK Issue Brief, 2015, Retrieved from https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/ files/
issue-briefs/Japan_ DPRK_Relations_Issue_Brief.pdf
29 Wang Yang, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda delivered his policy speech, 
International Online, January 25, 2012. 
30 Japan claimed that DPRK sent a positive signal to Japan, Morning News, January 20, 
2012.
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had been in stagnation for a long time. In 2009, North Korea carried out 
currency reform, but failed to achieve the desired goals, which brought further 
deterioration to domestic economic conditions.31 Faced with economic pressures 
after Kim Jong Un took office, he officially announced, “The national economy 
will be recovered in three years to the level in 1960s–1970s, so that the people 
can live to eat rice and drink the broth, live in tile-roofed house and wear 
silk clothes.”32 However, the recovery of the North Korean economy lacked 
a favorable international environment, for the western countries, especially 
the US and Japan still insisted on economic sanctions against North Korea. To 
promote economic recovery as soon as possible, the Kim Jong Un government 
was eager to see Japan loosen its sanctions on North Korea.
　The other reason is diplomatic. The Kim Jong Un government attempted to 
make the DPRK-US talks go more smoothly through contact with the Japanese 
government and suppressed the cozy contact between Japan and South Korea 
in order to avoid a situation where Japan and South Korea would work together 
to put pressure on North Korea. At the same time, the Kim Jong Un government 
also intended to weaken the coordination system between the US, Japan and 
South Korea by isolating the Lee Myung Bak government in Korea.33
　Driven by this goal, on April 16, 2012, in a meeting with the Japanese 
delegation who was invited to attend the commemoration of the 100th 
anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, Song Il Hoex pressed the idea that 
North Korea was willing to help Japan collect and return the Japanese remains 
which were still in North Korea.34 In order to win the trust of North Korea, 
the Noda cabinet secretly delivered an enormous amount of money to North 
31 Kita kyo kara shin tsuka shin no nerai wa taino zeikin?, Sankei Shimbun, December 7, 
2009, Retrieved from Sankei Shimbun database.
32 Kim Jong-unʼs economic goal-let people drink the broth in three years, The Yomiuri 
Shimbun, December 21, 2011.
33 Jiang Longfan, DPRKʼs foreign policy and DPRK-Japan relations in post-Kim Jong-il 
era, International Observation, No.3, 2012, pp. 69.
34 Hiraiwa Shunji, North Koreaʼs policy for internal and foreign affairs, International 
Issues, September 2012, p. 69.
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Korea.35 Thus, signs of Japan-DPRK improved relations appeared for the first 
time since the Noda cabinet took office.
　However, when Japan-DPRK relations were in the developing stages, North 
Korea suddenly tested missiles for the first time in April 2012, which again 
brought a huge and negative impact on Japan-DPRK relations. On March 16, 
2012, the Kim Jong Un government announced that North Korea would launch 
the experimental satellite in April in order to meet the 100th anniversary of the 
birth of Chairman Kim Il Sung.36 This move by the Kim Jong Un government 
caused widespread concerns in the international community. Japan, the US, 
South Korea and other countries accused North Korea of a clear violation of 
resolutions by the UN Security Council. On March 19, 2012, Japanese Defense 
Minister Naoki Tanaka also announced that the preparations should be 
made to deploy satelliteʼs interception system.37 Faced with pressure from the 
international community, North Korea claimed that the satellite launch was 
not only a legitimate right of sovereign states,38 but also necessary means to 
promote economic development, so North Korea would never give up satellite 
launch program.
　On April 13, 2012, North Korea test-fired missiles despite the advice and 
warnings of the international community. Regarding this, the Noda cabinet 
made a solemn protest, saying it was a provocative act in defiance of the 
international community. Noda also held security meetings twice that morning. 
At the meeting, he instructed applicable departments to continue to collect 
relevant information about the DPRK satellite launching, while strengthening 
cooperation with the countries concerned.
35 Jiang Feng, Large sums of money brought nothing, Nodaʼs plan of secret visit to 
North Korea failed, Japanese Xinhua Overseas Chinese Press, October 16, 2012.
36 Tetsuya Hakoda, N. Korea plans satellite launch to show off its ʻpower,ʼ Asia & Japan 
Watch, March 19, 2012, Retrieved from Kikuzo II Visualdatabase.
37 Japan to deploy missiles, destroyers for N.Korea ʻrocketʼ lunch, Asia & Japan Watch, 
March 20, 2012, Retrieved from Kikuzo II Visualdatabase.
38 Izumi Hajime, Kitachosen de Naniga Okite Iruno ka: Kim Jong Un Taisei no Zisso, 
Chikumashobo, 2013, p. 39.
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　It is noteworthy that in the process of expressing dissatisfaction with North 
Korea, the Noda cabinet made an earnest effort to avoid over-stimulating North 
Korea, attempting to keep the window of dialogue with North Korea open. The 
Noda cabinet did not want to see the Japan-DPRK dialogue mode established 
after the Democratic Party took office undermined due to the North Korean 
missile tests. Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba who was visiting the US stated, 
“there is no need to close the window,” which clearly reflected the diplomatic 
style of emphasizing both “dialogue” and “pressure” toward the DPRK.39
　On the other hand, after North Korea test-fired its missiles, the Noda 
cabinet sped up its steps to build a quasi-alliance between Japan, the US and 
South Korea, responding to the threats from North Korea. On May 21, 2012, 
Shinsuke Sugiyama, Director of Asia-Pacific Bureau of Foreign Ministry, went 
to Seoul to participate in the Japan-US-South Korea tri-party talks concerning 
Korean Peninsula issues.40 On June 21, 2012, Japanʼs Self-Defense Force (SDF) 
also participated in the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) joint military exercises 
held in the waters south of Jeju Island.41 Unavoidably, the Japan-North Korea 
relationship entered a slump through the Noda cabinetʼs series of practices, 
including strengthening military exchanges between the alliances, and 
corresponding to the missile crisis with the US and South Korea in a tougher 
approach.
　On June 13, 2012, during the two-plus-two talks, South Korea and the US 
determined a policy of restarting negotiations with North Korea.42 Following 
that, the Cabinet began the long-awaited Japan-DPRK contact. At this point, 
the Noda cabinet faced a very difficult domestic political situation and fell 
39 Zhou Zijing, UN Security Council only showed regrets to DPRKʼs satellite launch, 
Oriental Morning, April 14, 2012.
40 Nichi-bei-kan kokan, kita chohatsu ni ʻicchi shita kodo, The Sankei Shimbun, May 22, 
2012, Retrieved from Sankei Shimbun database.
41 Editorial / Japan, South Korea, U.S. must consolidate security cooperation, The Japan 
News, June 24, 2012, Retrieved from Yomidasu Rekishikandatabase.
42 Bei-kan, boei kyoryoku o kyoka 2+2, kyodo seimei o happyo, The Asahi Shimbun, Jun 
15, 2012. Retrieved from Kikuzo II Visualdatabase.
02_尹虎_16号.indd   25 2019/03/25   13:52
A Research on the Noda Cabinet’s Diplomatic Strategy: Focusing on the North Korea Policy26
deep into a power crisis. The Cabinet was plagued by some adverse factors, 
such as turmoil caused by the consumption tax increase bill, division within 
the Democratic Party, and bad performance in post-earthquake reconstruction. 
All these resulted in the Cabinetʼs support rate at record lows. In foreign 
affairs, the Japan-China relationship and the Japan-South Korea relationship 
was also in a slump because of historical issues and territorial disputes. To 
regain support, the Noda cabinet carried out a plan of improving Japan-DPRK 
relations.
5.	 Second	Set	of	Ups	and	Downs	of	Japan-DPRK	Relations	during	
Noda	Cabinet	Office	(Second	half	of	2012)
　By the joint efforts of Japan and North Korea, described in the previous 
chapter, bilateral relations between the two countries showed significant 
improvements again. On August 10, 2012, the Red Cross Society of Japan and 
its North Korean counterpart held bilateral talks after a lapse of 10 years.43 On 
August 29, 2012 in Beijing, Japan and the DPRK government restarted inter-
governmental consultations, achieving official contact after a lapse of four 
years dating back to August 2008.44 On September 17, 2012, in a campaign 
speech during the election of members of the Democratic Party, Prime 
Minister Noda said, “I hope to comb issues as soon as possible and promote 
formal consultations between governments.45 According to the ʻJapan-DPRK 
Pyongyang Declaration,ʼ Japan will make every effort to resolve the nuclear, 
missile and abduction issues, thus improving Japan-DPRK relations.” All these 
reflected the Noda cabinetʼs positive intention of promoting Japan-DPRK 
43 Nic-cho seifu ni kyoryoku yosei e ikotsu henkan, bosan, ryo sekizyuzi ga goi, The 
Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2012, Retrieved from Kikuzo II Visualdatabase.
44 North Korea talks to include abductions, but discussion likely to be drawn out, Asia 
& Japan Watch, September 1, 2012, Retrieved from Kikuzo II Visualdatabase.
45 Pyongyang sengen kara 10 nen shusho ʻsoki kyogi de kaiketsu, The Sankei Shimbun, 
September 18, 2012, Retrieved from Sankei Shimbun database.
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relations.46
　The Noda cabinet redoubled its efforts again on November 15, 2012 in 
Mongolia, and successfully launched secretary-level talks between the 
departments of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the DPRK.47 Although these 
negotiations and talks made no substantive progress, Jin Matsubara evaluated 
the situation of Japan-DPRK contacts by saying, “there would be no progress 
without talks,” which showed a willingness to continue to communicate with 
North Korea.
　In addition, unofficial exchanges between Japan and North Korea had also 
been strengthened. On November 14, 2012, the football team of Nippon Sport 
Science University paid a visit to North Korea and had a friendly match at Kim 
Il Sung Stadium in Pyongyang.48 Jang, the Vice Chairman of the DPRK National 
Defense Commission came to watch the match in person. This highlighted that 
it was a good opportunity once again to improve relations between Japan and 
North Korea.
　Thus, the Noda cabinet strategy of luring North Korea to return to the 
negotiation table had achieved some success, which paved the way for another 
improvement between Japan-DPRK relations. However, this time of good 
relations was short-lived. On December 1, 2012, North Korea announced the 
launch of the satellite program again.49 After that, Japan-DPRK relations once 
again deteriorated. Late that night, Prime Minister Noda held an emergency 
cabinet meeting at the prime ministerʼs residence due to the North Korean 
announcement of its missile-launch plans. At the meeting, the cabinet made 
46 Noda said Japan would promote Japan-DPRK formal consultations as soon as 
possible to improve bilateral relations, China News, September 17, 2012, Retrieved 
from http://www. chinanews.com/gj/2012/09-17/4190171.shtml
47 Ratchi, taiwa keizoku de goi nic-cho ʻsoki ni ziki kyogi,ʼThe Asahi Shimbun, Novemver 
17, 2012, Retrieved from Kikuzo II Visualdatabase.
48 Nit-tai-dai no hochodan, Pyongyang de sakka koryu, The Sankei Shimbun, Novemver 
15, 2012, Retrieved from Sankei Shimbun database.
49 Govt scuttles N. Korea talks over rocket launch, The Japan News, December 3, 2012, 
Retrieved from Yomidasu Rekishikandatabase.
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a decision to postpone the secretary-level meeting between Japan and North 
Korea which was originally scheduled on December 5 in Beijing, as well as 
requiring the relevant departments to strengthen intelligence gathering and 
analysis to be prepared to deal with any incidents. Noda also expressed his 
willingness to work together with the US, China, South Korea, Russia and other 
countries to persuade North Korea to give up its missile launch.50
　For the “2012 North Korea second missile test,” the Noda cabinet adopted 
tough measures, and implemented various strategies such as exaggerating the 
dangers through the media and worsening the situation by the use of the SDF. 
On December 7, 2012, Prime Minister Noda, dressed in camouflage uniform, 
inspected the “Patriot-3” troops. During the inspection he stated, “Although 
the election is important, defending the security of the country and its people 
is of the utmost importance.”51 The Noda cabinetʼs correspondence clearly 
reflected his intention of reversing the disadvantages in the election campaign 
of the House of Representatives by using the “North Korean threat.” It can be 
said that it was the North Korean plan of its satellite launch that offered a rare 
opportunity for the Noda cabinet that was making preparations for the election 
of the House of Representatives on December 16, 2012.
　After North Korea launched a missile on December 12, 2012, the Noda 
cabinet took a tougher policy toward North Korea and criticized North Koreaʼs 
provocations in high profile, showing a strong government stance.52 North 
Korea seemed to understand the difficulties which Prime Minister Noda was 
facing, and did not retaliate against Japanʼs criticism. Furthermore, it took 
an easing policy toward Japan. On December 26, 2012, Prime Minister Noda 
announced his resignation and that of the entire Cabinet.
50 North Korea announced another satellite launch, neighboring countries worried 
about the regional situation, People’s Daily, December 2, 2012.
51 Noda exaggerated the threat of North Koreaʼs satellite launch, Chongqing Morning 
News, December 14, 2012.
52 Kita misairu hassha seifu, ampori ketsugi mezasu kinkyu kaigo hazimaru, The 
Yomiuri Shimbun, December 13, 2012, Retrieved from Yomidasu Rekishikandatabase.
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6.	 Summary:	 Style	 and	 Features	 of	 the	 Noda	 Cabinet’s	 North	
Korea	Policy
　Postwar Japan-DPRK relations went through many ups and downs, and 
it was especially complicated in the early years of Kim Jong Un regime. In 
summation, the Noda cabinet showed a clear style and characteristic in its 
diplomatic policies toward North Korea. In terms of the process of carrying 
out its policies, the Noda administrationʼs main style and features can be 
summarized in the following five points.
　First, the Cabinet transformed the rhythm between “pressure” and “dialogue.” 
Over many years, Japanʼs policy toward North Korea had followed the 
precedent of “pressure-dialogue-pressure-dialogue,” and it is clear that the 
Noda cabinet policy toward North Korea also reflects the tone of this policy. 
At the beginning stage of its office, the Cabinet implemented the easing policy 
toward North Korea. However, it did not last long. The Cabinet showed a tough 
stance and pressure on North Korea because of its missile tests.
　Next, the Cabinet catered to American policies toward North Korea. 
Maintaining harmonious relations with the US is the basis for Japanʼs security 
strategy and foreign policy. The Noda cabinet continued to adhere to this 
principle when tackling Korean issues. As shown in Chapter 3, after the US and 
the DPRK began to make contact through the New York channel in December 
2011, the Noda cabinet also expanded its governmentʼs contacts with the Kim 
Jong Un government. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 4, it was after the 
US and South Korea determined the easing policy toward the DPRK during 
the two-plus-two talks in June 2012 that the Noda cabinet re-opened Japan-
DPRK negotiations, which had been laid aside because of the missile crisis. The 
Cabinetʼs very important policy toward the DPRK proceeded simultaneously 
with the USʼs policy toward the DPRK, which reflects the tendency of “the 
US leads, Japan follows.” Japanʼs diplomacy toward North Korea is greatly 
influenced by the US and Korea as well as its domestic political situation, and 
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they determine the twists and turns of the Japan-DPRK relations.53
　The third point is that the Cabinet strengthened its power in regional affairs 
by using the crises on the Korean Peninsula. The Noda cabinet upgraded its 
military and foreign policy, whose main goal was to strengthen Japan-US 
cooperation to deepen mutual relations between Japan, the US and South Korea, 
aiming to expand Japanʼs influence on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast 
Asia.54 The Noda cabinet actively promoted negotiations related to the Japan-
Korea Agreement on the Protection of Military Secrets, and sent the SDF to 
implement joint exercises with South Korean military forces as mentioned in 
Chapter 4. The Noda cabinet, together with the US, contributed to the tripartite 
talks between Japan, the US and South Korea held on January 17 and May 21 
of 2012, also as mentioned in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Three countries thus 
conducting consultations on North Korean issues enabled Japan to strengthen 
its impact on political situations on the Korean Peninsula.
　The fourth point is that the Cabinet made diplomacy toward the DPRK serves 
domestic politics. The Noda cabinet attached great importance to the strategy of 
improving its support rate by means of negotiations with the DPRK. The Noda 
cabinet once secretly offered huge amounts of money to North Korea, hoping 
to find a way to resolve the abduction issue as mentioned in Chapter 4. To win 
the 2012 election in the House of Representatives, Noda also used the “2012 
North Korea second missile test” to build a strong image of the government. In 
this way, the main driving force of Noda cabinetʼs diplomacy toward the DPRK 
arises primarily from domestic factors, reflecting the features of pursuing short-
term effects.
　The final point is that the Cabinet pursued cooperation with China. As 
shown in Chapter 3, on December 25, 2011, when Noda visited China, he put 
forward a tentative plan to cooperate with the Chinese government on Korean 
53 Yang Guang, Why Japan-DPRK Relations Stagnated, World News, July 23, 2010.
54 Zhang Liangui，The motivation and prospects of reconciliation between Japan and 
the DPRK，World knowledge, ,No.15, 2014, pp.31.
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issues. When North Korea test-fired missiles in April and December of 2012, 
the Noda cabinet also hoped to cooperate with China in order to deal with the 
crisis. However, because of territorial and historical disputes, Sino-Japanese 
relations deteriorated. Concerning Korean issues, the international environment 
became more complex and changeable, which made it more difficult for the 
Noda cabinet to achieve the desired results in its policy toward North Korea. 
In addition, in May 2012, when Japan, China and South Korea held a summit 
meeting in South Korea, Prime Minister Noda also planned to involve the 
DPRK issue in the joint statement.55 However, the summit talks between the 
leaders of China and Japan failed to materialize because of the territorial issue 
and the World Uyghur Congress which was held in Japan.56 As a result, the 
Noda cabinet failed in its plans to seek cooperation with China on Korean 
issues.57
7.	 Concluding	Remarks
　Although the Noda cabinet experienced many unexpected situations from the 
Korean Peninsula, such as Kim Jong Ilʼs death and North Koreaʼs two missile 
tests in 2012, which were conducted in April and December, it achieved some 
success in diplomacy toward the DPRK, which not only laid a foundation for 
Japanʼs policies toward the DPRK in the “post-Kim Jong Il era,” but also paved the 
way for the smooth development of relations between Japan and North Korea 
during Abeʼs second term in office. Facing the complex and volatile situation 
in Northeast Asia, the Cabinet adopted a series of noteworthy policies toward 
North Korea. The style and features of the Cabinetʼs policy toward North Korea 
55 North Korea omitted from accord / Japan, China, South Korea issue joint declaration 
after summit meeting, The Japan News, May 15, 2012, Retrieved from Yomidasu 
Rekishikandatabase.
56 Uyghur kaigiʼ chugoku nippon kensei zimin-giin ni shokan, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 
May 16, 2012, Retrieved from Yomidasu Rekishikan database.
57 Japanese media: Noda hopes to hold bilateral talks with President Hu Jintao but is 
denied, Ning Xia News, May 15, 2012.
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were closely related to Japan-US, Japan-South Korea, Japan-China and Japan-
Russia relations. During its governance in a 16-month period, the easing policy 
toward the DPRK got a big boost and Japan-DPRK relations embraced a new 
era.
　In confrontations between countries, Japan and the DPRK will be able to 
make compromises with each other only when they ultimately achieve win-
win results, since no country can become the ultimate winner in todayʼs world. 
If DPRK-Japan relations can be normalized, Japan will not only improve its 
security but also benefit greatly economically. It can be concluded that the 
improvement of DPRK-Japan relations have great importance for both sides, 
and the process of its improvement will still be long and tortuous.58
58 Liu JiangYong, Situation of the Korean Peninsula and Sustainable Security of 
Northeast Asia, Northeast Asia Forum, No.3, 2016, pp.10-11.
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（日本語レジュメ）
野田内閣の外交戦略に関する考察――対北朝鮮政策を中心に
尹　　虎
神野　雅代
　日本にとっての朝鮮半島の重要かつ衰えることのない戦略的な重要性を決
めるのは、地理的な自然環境である。しかし、歴史問題と現実的な利害関係
が日本と北朝鮮の関係を長期的で複雑、敏感で脆弱なものにしている。そして、
このような関係が戦後の日本において「対北朝鮮政策」を「アジア外交」の
非常に重要な課題とした。本研究では、北東アジアの枠組みを背景として日
朝関係を議論し、野田内閣の北朝鮮政策を検討・分析し、これらの政策の特
徴を詳細に明らかにする。
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